In the next 30-90 days, leadership instability increases the probability of tighter vendor payment terms (e.g., shift from net-60 to net-30 or cash-in-advance on high-demand brands), more conservative inventory allocations and higher in-season stockouts in key luxury categories. Creditors and DIP lenders typically demand a clear restructuring thesis, operating plan and accountable leadership; a CEO change now can delay approvals, slow store rationalization decisions and weaken negotiating leverage with landlords, raising the cash burn risk during the pre-filing and early court period. Customer experience risk also rises as store teams face uncertainty, increasing sales associate attrition and undermining conversion during peak event moments (private sales, clienteling cycles).

Over 6-12 months, a van Raemdonck-led operating agenda could re-center the business on merchandising discipline, vendor partnership stability and omni-clienteling rather than financial engineering, improving the probability of a successful emergence plan. If Chapter 11 results in meaningful lease resets and SG&A reduction, Saks Global could exit with a smaller but healthier store fleet and a more resilient working-capital model; however, prolonged leadership churn could cement brand partners' decision to prioritize direct-to-consumer, reducing Saks Global's access to exclusives and top-tier allocations for multiple seasons. The combined Saks-Neiman platform may still offer strategic value as a national luxury distribution and services layer, but only if it can maintain luxury brand trust through the restructuring timeline.

Competitors with stable balance sheets and consistent leadership (e.g., Nordstrom, Bloomingdale's, Selfridges/Harrods in tourist corridors, plus luxury brands' own boutiques and e-commerce) can capture share from vendor pullback and customer uncertainty. Luxury houses may use this disruption to accelerate controlled distribution, shifting more inventory to owned retail and concession models while tightening wholesale exposure; digitally strong multi-brand players can exploit the moment with faster fulfillment and clearer loyalty value. If van Raemdonck joins, Saks Global could regain some credibility with brand CEOs and wholesale directors, but competitors will push for reallocation of limited product in key categories (handbags, fine jewelry, top-tier footwear) for at least 2-3 seasons.

Suppliers and brand partners are likely to increase credit protection (letters of credit, tighter returns allowances, reduced markdown support) and reduce forward commitments until court protections clarify. Landlords may accelerate demands for rent assurance or negotiate for store exits; the most at-risk locations are secondary malls where luxury footfall is already pressured. Customers face potential disruptions in alterations, repairs and returns if policies change under restructuring; high-VIC clients may migrate to brand boutiques unless clienteling continuity is preserved. Logistics and service partners (fulfillment, payment processors) may seek renegotiated terms, increasing operational friction and the need for weekly liquidity monitoring.